金正恩对“稍纵即逝的机会”踌躇

中文

亚洲时报分析，金正恩面对外交窗口期的“稍纵即逝的机会”显得踌躇，朝鲜外交走向存变数。

原文链接：https://asiatimes.com/2026/08/kim-jong-un-balks-at-grasping-fleeting-opportunity/

North Korean paramount leader Kim Jong-un has demonstrated he can make bold policy decisions. In 2013 he sought to frighten his senior officials into obedience by ordering the execution of his uncle and senior mentor Jang Song-thaek. In 2017 he kept his nerve and continued to develop a nuclear missile capability despite US threats of a preventive attack. In 2018 he broke out of international isolation by meeting with the leaders of the US, China and the Republic of Korea (ROK). Starting in 2022 he aligned his country with Russia. In 2024 he abandoned his legendary grandfather’s commitment to reunification with South Korea. Nevertheless, Kim may be passing up what looks like a historically unique window of opportunity. On August 16, US President Donald Trump announced in a social media post that he is ordering the US Department of Defense to “substantially reduce” joint US-South Korea military exercises. The standard rationale for these exercises is they are needed to maintain the two allies’ readiness to defeat a possible North Korean invasion. Trump, however, repeated his criticism that US-ROK military exercises are “costly” and “hostile” toward North Korea. The latter word echoes a perennial Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) talking point. Trump’s social media post also said that during his presidency, North Korea “has been unthreatening and respectful.” A few reminders are necessary here. While Trump was president, the DPRK demonstrated a credible intercontinental ballistic missile capability; conducted what Pyongyang said was a hydrogen bomb test; threatened to “reduce the US mainland into ashes and darkness”; tested ballistic, cruise and hypersonic missiles; sent thousands of soldiers to fight for Russia against Ukraine; and provided Russia with missiles that have killed Ukrainians. Trump’s willingness to overlook these dark data points is part of his approach toward Pyongyang. Trump followed his Aug. 17 post about curtailing US-ROK military exercises with another post the next day that displayed a photo of Kim talking on a telephone with the caption, “Hey Donald, we cool … Right?” These were only the latest of many signals, going back to before he returned to the White House, that Trump wants to restart summitry with Kim, which crashed after three meetings between the two men in 2018-2019. In June, Trump reportedly told South Korean President Lee Jae-myung that it was “time to pay attention” to the DPRK. That same month Trump also posted on social media a photo of himself and Kim walking together in Singapore, considered a successful summit. Trump’s attitude toward the Korean Peninsula is extremely unusual and not likely to recur in its totality in any future US presidency. It’s not only that he has repeatedly expressed disapproval of the alliance’s military exercises as “provocative” to North Korea. He also consistently touts his friendly personal relationship with Kim; he wants to withdraw US troops from South Korea; and ,at his first summit with Kim, he agreed to the goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” by which Pyongyang means the withdrawal of the US nuclear umbrella from South Korea. Trump is also relatively unsentimental toward South Korea. His August 16 post mentioned his annoyance that South Korea did not send warships to support the US effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Trump expanded on that angle in comments to journalists on Aug. 17. Lee, he said, refused a request to “give us a hand with Iran … guarding the Strait,” leading Trump to ask rhetorically “Why are we involved in helping you? … We can’t go around and protect all of these countries, especially when they’re not there to help us.” The resentment toward South Korea as an alleged defense free-rider undermines what might otherwise be an obstacle to reaching an agreement that reduces US pressure on Pyongyang. It’s safe to assume the unpopularity of the Iran war and his sinking public approval polls only make Trump more desirous to gain a foreign policy win, especially one he thinks might qualify him for a Nobel Prize. Trump has a little more than two more years in office. His successor, whether from the Republican or Democratic Party, will not be anywhere near as favorably disposed toward accommodating important Pyongyang objectives. Kim should be jumping at the chance to meet with Trump again. But thus far he is not. There is no official acknowledgment, let alone acceptance, from Pyongyang of Trump’s overtures. On August 19, Kim’s politically powerful sister Kim Yo-jong said she knows of no current communication between her brother and Trump. Kim might benefit in several ways from renewed talks with Trump. One possible prize would be the lifting of US economic sanctions. This is not as big a deal now thatRussia and China are no longer enforcing international economic sanctions and the DPRK economy is performing modestly well, having grown by at least 3 percent for each of the last three years. But it would be a welcome relief for the regime. The US effectively embargoes commerce and financial transactions with North Korea. The most damaging aspect is deterring foreign banks from doing business with the DPRK because of the risk they would be shut out of the US financial system. The president has the legal authority to reduce or remove most US economic sanctions against North Korea. Like Trump, Pyongyang wants US troops to leave South Korea. This is a decades-old, official demand. It is baked into Pyongyang’s frequent complaints about the US having a “hostile policy” toward the North. The DPRK government cites the presence of US forces as a reason for tensions on the Peninsula and a justification for the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. While Kim has sometimes downplayed the urgency of this demand, there is no question it would support North Korea’s grand strategy. US military capabilities substantially augment South Korea’s conventional combat strength, which North Korea sees as a threat. Removing them from the Peninsula would immediately improve the DPRK’s sense of security. This step would eliminate the “tripwire” guarantee of US intervention in a new Korean War. It would largely de-fang US-ROK-Japan security cooperation. It would represent an ideological and political triumph for the Kim regime. Most importantly, it would be a major and perhaps decisive step toward dissolving the US-ROK alliance, opening the possibility of Pyongyang exercising greater leverage over the South. Furthermore, Kim could use talks with the US as an opening for talks with Japan.Tokyo no longer demands resolution of the abduction issue as a precondition for talks with Pyongyang. The Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 noted that both sides agreed to Japan “providing economic co-operation after the normalization by the Japanese side to the DPRK side” to compensate for Japan causing “tremendous damage and suffering to the people of Korea through its colonial rule in the past.” This could unlock billions of dollars of Japanese economic assistance, which would go a long way in North Korea’s relatively small economy. So why the hesitancy to restart diplomacy with the US? It is possible that Kim is still traumatized by the outcome of the Hanoi Summit. The US side surprised Kim by refusing to lift economic sanctions in exchange for a closure of most of the facilities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, after which Trump ended the summit early. Kim felt a loss of face because he left the meeting empty-handed, suggesting he failed. But things have changed. Since Pyongyang has made abundantly clear that its nuclear weapons program is no longer on the table, and the US is still interested in talking, Kim could reframe the talks around a different objective. Outsiders, and particularly Americans, have often accused Kim of acting irrationality. In this case he might be letting his emotions get in the way of grasping an opportunity. Another possible consideration for Kim is how a meeting with Trump would affect Kim’s relations with Russia and China.These partnerships may now be more valuable to the DPRK than a potentially improved relationship with Washington. China is still the DPRK’s largest trade partner by far, with pledges to deepen bilateral economic cooperation even further. The DPRK gets cash, food, energy and advanced military technology from Russia, plus combat experience from participating in Russia’s war against Ukraine. During the World War II victory celebration in Beijing in 2025, China honored Kim by having him walk down a red carpet shoulder-to-shoulder with Xi and Putin, an amazing overachievement by the leader of a small and fundamentally weak country. Theoretically, there might be a risk that Moscow and/or Beijing would hold back potential benefits to punish Pyongyang for reconciliation with the US government, a tradeoff Kim might view as unfavorable. North Korea has learned over the years, however, that improving relations with one outside major power motivates others to court Pyongyang’s favor harder, offering more rather than fewer benefits. Outreach to the US would signal to Russia and China, both of which seek to maintain their influence over Pyongyang, that the DPRK has other options, and that the Russians and Chinese must do more to stay in the competition. An example: Xi kept his distance from the DPRK government for the first seven and a half years of Kim’s rule, but invited Kim to visit China in March 2018 only after the announcement that Kim would meet Trump for their first summit in Singapore. Kim and Xi met a total of three times in 2018. It is fair to assume the prospect of better DPRK-US relations prodded Xi to get closer to Pyongyang out of fear of being left out. China may even welcome Kim-Trump summitry as an indirect way of limiting Russian influence over the DPRK. So Kim may not be such a smart cookie after all. For supporters of the US-ROK alliance, Kim’s delay in responding to Trump’s overtures is not necessarily a problem. As the Hanoi Summit underscored, no deal is better than a bad deal. Denny Roy is a senior fellow, East-West Center, Honolulu. Denny Roy must serving drinks to gringos and listening to their drunk stories. What EXACTLY does anything need from Chump? This USELESS carnival barking street dog cannot negotiate himself out of a toilet, let alone do any deals with anybody. Chump is a walking dead man. His political career died barely half a year into his 4 year term thanks to Team Epstein But North Korea doesn’t need anything from America. Why should Kim Jong Un meet with Trump? North Korea wants U.S recognition of its nuclear power status. U.S. doesn’t want to do that. If North Korea gives up nuclear weapons, U.S will kill Kim Jong Un like U.S. killed Ali Khamenei. The Israelified dogs of America killed Khamenei and all they got was the world’s largest state funeral. Iran, already obliterated 100 times, is still in control of the situation. All that Mossad and CIA “intelligence” and I already knew better than them, broadcasting it here at Asia Times. Iran is already a de facto nuclear power. In fact, you do not even need nukes to defeat the Israelified street dogs who excel at shooting women and children. You need sandals and hearts of diamonds. No tanks, planes or ships needed. Yemen proved it. Afghanistan proved it.

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